‘Not true’: Ex-South Korean FM refutes Trump’s tariff claims, urges stronger India ties | Interview

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has ushered in an era of uncertainty in the global order. The new US administration’s strictly transactional approach is catching American allies off guard, pushing them to diversify their bilateral partnerships and take security matters into their own hands.

In this fast-changing geopolitical landscape, South Korea is feeling the heat of Trump’s hardline stance. From trade to security, Seoul is grappling with new challenges stemming from its treaty ally – the US.

In this exclusive interview with Firstpost Managing Editor Palki Sharma, Dr Kyung-wha Kang, President and CEO of the Asia Society and former foreign minister of South Korea shares insights on how Seoul is preparing to navigate the Trump challenge.

Here is the full interview:

The world order is shifting. America is stepping back from its traditional role as the backbone of Western alliances. Europe is rethinking its defence, and the global attention is turning to Asia. How will this region navigate the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape? To discuss this and more, I have with me, Doctor Kyung-wha Kang, President and CEO of the Asia Society. We live at a time when there’s a considerable churn in the world. The alliances are shifting, power dynamics are shifting. How do you think Asia is positioned to handle this churn?

Yes, there is that churn but the larger flow of history toward greater importance of Asia and the global dynamics of the weight of geopolitical decision making increasingly moving towards Asia, the wealth generation of the global community in Asia. I think that will continue. But of course, Asia is not a uniform entity. There is division within Asia. But that fluidity has now sort of come to heads on because of President Trump’s (of US) return to power. I think we all are having a hard time to digest all the announcements coming out of Washington DC these days.

First of all, there is that economic challenge. For example, tariffs. That is a shock to export-oriented countries like South Korea, but in addition to that, we have a non-conventional approach by President Trump to the current issues of peace and security; either it’s dealing with the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. And clearly you’re saying, well, Europe, you take care of your own security.

And the Europeans have suddenly woke up. But I think that approach that ‘you take care of your own security’ will pretty much apply to the alliances in the Indo-Pacific and South Korea, Japan, Australia and so on and so forth. So we have to prepare for that. He hasn’t pronounced himself, specifically beyond the campaign pledges on, beyond that to a specific issue that he will have to be confronted.

But I think he will demand more. Certainly. He demanded more when we were, in government, then it was his first term. So, I think more demand, more pressure clearly. I think the governments in the Indo-Pacific region have to be prepared. India is not a security ally in the traditional sense, but the United States and India have been forging closer ties over these years during the first Trump term and then during the Biden administration.

And now we know that the prime minister (Modi) has had a very successful visit to Washington DC as one of the first heads of state to see Mr Trump.

And the outcome of that, as we could see in the joint communique, was a very, very substantive one, including closer cooperation in the defence industry sector. So, there will be strengthening in some areas with countries like, India.

I think India will also face a lot of pressure on the trade side, because India also has a big trade surplus, or deficit seen from the US side. So, I think countries have to be prepared to deal with various demands and, and push coming from Mr. Trump.

You’ve raised a lot of points and I will come to all of them through the course of our conversation. But you mentioned that you worked with the first Trump administration when you were in government. Now, as somebody who still tracks policies very closely, What difference do you see in their approach? Is this a more, determined or focused administration?

Yes. I think President Trump during his first term was there, but you also had many traditionalist diplomats, securocrats, who had their way of doing things vis-a-vis president’s unconventional way of doing things. And the two combined to, I think, temper his excesses, if I may put it that way.

This time he’s come back fully prepared. He had think tanks preparing projects for him, for example, the Heritage Foundation Project 2025.

And so that’s why from day one, he’s able to declare various kinds of executive orders. I think that would count nearly 100 or even, over 100 and bills introduced into the Congress so clearly, clearly, much more prepared and also surrounded by much more loyalists around him than the previous administrations. Yes, he’s very emboldened and, very, unrestrained in moving in the direction that he wants to.

Last year in an interview, you said, and I’m quoting, the centre of gravity of global affairs is slowly but surely moving towards Asia. Do you think that Asia is shaping the global order moving forward? And do you think that the second top administration or Trump’s return to the White House has accelerated this?

The US pivot to Asia has been happening since the Obama administration.

Then Trump and then (Joe) Biden’s administration. So that’s An ongoing pivot on the American side. And I think that clearly underscores the US understanding of the increasing importance of Asia. So yes, I expect that very much to continue. The US has other challenges and that has been preoccupying its attention during the past few years with, with the Gaza situation and Ukraine. I think President Trump wants to resolve the Ukraine war as quickly as he can.

And he’s able to bring the two sides to agree to a couple of small ceasefires. That clearly is not enough. There will have to be more robust, more comprehensive, ceasefire and then a peace agreement. But I think Mr. Trump will want to focus more of his energy in the Indo-Pacific region.

And which country is better positioned to shape this order, is it India or China, according to you?

Well, that’s a tough question. I think both are big players. And as we know, that bilateral relationship will very much define how the Asian century unfolds. From the point of view of a country like South Korea, which wants increasing, relations with India, politically, defence-industry wise, but certainly economically, while building that bilateral relationship, we also have a close, important relationship with China, both economically but also because of the challenge of North Korea and security challenge for the whole of the world that needs to be managed and that management requires China’s constructive engagement.

So, for many reasons, South Korea has important ties to China as well. So, from that point of view, and I think all important countries in in Asia will want India and China, as difficult as it is, for that relationship to move along a constructive trajectory.

I think India would want that too and we have seen the efforts from New Delhi. But we’ve also seen the multiple flashpoints emerging in the region, in Asia, with the increasing Chinese expansionism and military moves. And, you mentioned Donald Trump and his approach to security and he’s saying that even if you’re an ally, you have to pay for security. South Korea is a treaty ally. What does it mean for you country.

Well, the idea of, of sharing the cost of that alliance, i.e. sharing the cost of the troop presence in South Korea has been an ongoing issue in this alliance. Initial understanding, agreement was, when Korea was very poor, that America would pay for the troop presence, Korea will provide the land.

But as Korea went off on this economic growth trajectory and became more, rich, there was an additional agreement to spell out Korea’s share of this. And that has continued to increase. Every time we negotiate, Korea share would increase. And so that was pretty much our approach. You can’t go from 1 billion to 5 billion overnight.

And these are government budgets that need to be passed through the National Assembly. During the first president Trump term, we couldn’t get to agreement because, the president was demanding too much and something that we just couldn’t deliver, given our budgetary system. I think there is expectation that he will again demand something that we cannot agree to, in the initial realm. But then there has to be intense negotiation to arrive at something that we can agree to.

On the campaign trail, he mentioned 10 billion. Do you think that was a pressure tactic or a genuine ask?

Well, that does seem to be his usual way of approaching, the negotiation, you know, high level bar. But then, you know, in the process of negotiation, there has to be something that the two sides can agree to. That’s the art of negotiation as the way Mr. Trump seems to see.

Where does it leave allies like South Korea in terms of your security umbrella? Can you trust Trump’s America to come to your rescue in the event of an attack. Can you depend on American security?

Well, where is our threat assessment. And for us, it is North Korea. Increasingly nuclear and missiles capable North Korea.

We have a DMZ that keeps the two sides separate. But there’s something can always flare up. And so, we maintain a strong defence posture, a deterrence for what North Korea might do. And we believe that is there not just for our defense, but also for the security interest of the United States. If something happens on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea demonstrates its weapons of mass destruction capabilities, not just in terms of testing, but the real use of that, in an a real conflict; that will be devastating for the US-led security order, the US’ own security interests.

So, I would think that defence of South Korea and the world beyond is also in the interest of the United States and this is the whole idea of a joint security deterrence posture between the US troops, between the US security presence on the Korean Peninsula and the South Korean military. The point is that threat is a shared threat.

And if that threat materialises in something real, it’s in the interest of both countries to fight against it together.

The US Energy Department recently placed South Korea in the category of sensitive countries. Other countries in this category include Iran, North Korea and Russia. Do you think that was a logistical mixup or it was a message?

On that point, I only know what’s in the news I think, what has come out in the news is that it had to do with security issues in some research institute and despite that, technical research cooperation between the two sides will continue beyond that I haven’t seen anything. But I also know that the acting US ambassador in South Korea has said this is not a big deal. So, you combine the two of them and and I have to say, it’s not that serious issue, but there was a history 30 years ago when it was a real issue.

There was an attempt at a lab in Korea to go around the nuclear agreement between the two sides to research something that that they shouldn’t have. And that was a big issue, that we needed to find a way forward to get us off that list, 30 years ago. So we have that recollection.

So, I think that’s why it’s further fuelling all kinds of, theories, about why we are there this time.

Most capitals in the world are trying to gear up to respond to Trump’s moves. What complicates the story especially for South Korea, is the fact that you have an ongoing political crisis. How does it impact your preparedness to respond?

Well, I think clearly, it has had a huge negative impact. The country has been in limbo since the day the president declared martial law in early December and the impeachment, the process has been so long. The Constitutional Court has been deliberating and is taking its time to come up with a decision.

Meanwhile, the country has been unable to move on.

The economy was in a very difficult situation prior to the martial law declaration. And in the middle of this lack of national leadership, I think, you know, the people don’t see the economic side. And from within, it’s a divided situation, so you are either for impeachment. But then there’s been a growing voice against impeachment.

So in the midst of this, the country seems to have lost the sight of where is the economy. And we know, given the Trump tariff measures, you have to have a strategy. You have to have a way to deal with these tariffs coming our way. And currently, I think the government, even without the president, we have an acting prime minister who is now reinstated as acting.

You really need that highest level of authority to have a discussion with, with the highest authority in the United States and other countries to be able to respond as effectively as they could. And this is just not happening. So at the ministerial level, there are very active businesses are very active.

But, yes, ultimately we will need a president, with a full power and authority of the office to meet President Trump.

And the tariff deadline is approaching: April 2nd.

April 2nd. We’ll see how that declaration is. Will it be across the board or will it be country by country? Will it be sector specific? So there’s a lot of details that we won’t know until that day comes.

But he says the South Korean tariffs are four times the US tariffs.

Not true. Not true. We have an FTA, bilateral FTA, and according to that it’s almost zero. Overall. There are certain sectors where it’s high, but on average it’s low. This is what our trade authorities tell me. It’s very low. That is a very robust, free trade agreement. It was negotiated and it was renegotiated during Trump one. And so, he might want to renegotiate that again, but it’s already a very ambitious, free trade agreement.

So, you think the president is misinformed or he’s doing it for effect?

Maybe for effect. I think he must get all the briefings that he needs. But he has this way of, exaggerating things, if I may put it that way. Yeah.

But if he were to impose reciprocal tariffs with the assumption that South Korea tariffs are four times, how should Seoul respond?

Well, which is not true. It’s not four times, we’re nearly zero. And I think you you need to start with the facts, where the tariffs are currently.

The way things are moving with partners like India and South Korea, both countries are American partners and both want to work together with each other. Do you think this growing isolationism and the tariff war is going to give more reasons to nations like India and South Korea to work together what specific areas according to you.

I think so. There is already a very strong push between India and Korea to bring economic collaboration closer together, bringing technological cooperation closer together. But with Mr. Trump’s pressure on both sides, I think it’s just human nature.

If Big Brother causes you, lots of problems than the, then the other neighborhoods would naturally want to come closer together.

And I see, trade between the two countries have grown over the recent years. There is a lot more investment coming in from South Korea to India. And so, the current situation, will only be a further incentive and momentum for that relationship to, to grow.

There’s also talk of expanding this Squad group of countries to include countries like India and South Korea. Do you think Seoul should join this alliance to counter Beijing?

Well, South Korea has been a part of not the quad but the quad plus, I think beginning with the Covid days, when the quad invited a couple of other countries to discuss how do we better respond to the Covid situation. So, you know, so Korea is part of the quad plus on issues of public health and climate change.

So, in functional areas, I think Korea will continue to be very happy to be a part of it. But, I’m not part of the government. I don’t know what the thinking is within the South Korean government to expand that, to deepen that, to more areas, including, security dialogue.

I was talking about Squad but since you mentioned Quad…

Oh, you were talking about squad. The squad issue is something rather sudden, and I think, India and South Korea have been invited. My sense is that it’s not a policy as such from the Philippine government that announced this.

Therefore, I don’t think it’s something that has the Indian or the South Korean government closely analysing and considering whether they should join this or not. It seems almost like an off the cuff suggestion at the Raisina Dialogue I understand. And so, my bet is it’s not some, serious issue that is being thought in Seoul or here in New Delhi. As the minister Jaishankar (Indian foreign minister) said, he was asked that question in our conversation, would India join the squad? And he said we’re happy with quad as it.

Do you see a larger role for South Korea in the Quad?

I think the standing line of the Korean government is that we appreciate the role of the quad in in strengthening peace and prosperity in the region, and we’re very happy to take part in these functional areas where we as a country have capabilities.

And that’s the official line. I don’t know if there’s any further thinking beyond that.

Even the quad partners say that they are just working together, incorporating various areas. But, Beijing sees it as an anti-China alliance and sees a military dimension to it.

I think the quad is seen, from China’s perspective, is clearly seen that way. But the quad plus, our whole idea of in the Indo-Pacific strategy is, it has to be, you know, it has to be an inclusive and open and transparent.

And I don’t think from the South Korean government that our participation in the quad plus, has the undercurrent of a containment of China.

You mentioned having a conversation with minister Jaishankar. And, in that conversation, you hailed India’s policy of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. How do you see Prime Minister Modi’s approach to foreign policy and the way he has shaped India’s relationship with the world?

I think, very, very admirable.

I mean, his, the domestic leadership and all the reforms and the minister being the face of advocating for India’s national interests on the global stage has been one of the, you know, more capable performances as foreign minister that I could see. So, India creating that space for an independent, foreign policy stance. I think non-alignment is not the word. The minister used ‘multi polarity’, I think, is the word but you know, that ability to capturing the fluidity in these conceptual terms I think is a clear indication of, India’s, if I may put it, creativity. And with that creativity, creating this space, autonomous, strategic space for strategic autonomy and, and multi polarity.

So yes, I think, there are lots of people, looking at India’s playbook to see how we position ourselves in this changing global dynamics

And India works with all sides, with the Russians and Americans, with the Europeans, with countries in the global south. Do you think India has a role to play in resolving some of the conflicts that we see in Gaza, Ukraine, elsewhere?

I think, generally speaking, yes. I think, but in terms of the specificities of the conflict, every one of these conflicts have so much history, so many players in and out.

So I can’t say for, this conflict or that conflict, but given India’s growing profile, yes, I think India can be, more ambitious, if I may put it that way, to play the role of that bridge-builder or facilitator. Facilitator may be the best word to use at this point.

Doctor Kang, we see headlines all the time, some very dramatic ones that say this is the end of globalisation, American isolationism, world is more divided than ever before. And there may be some truth to some of those things. As someone who has studied and shaped foreign policy for years. How do you see our world today? Did you see some of the moves that we’re seeing right now, Did you see them coming?

Well, you know, I can’t say when I was foreign minister for four years, I would not have expected the world as it’s today. I would not have expected Gaza to be, the Middle East to be the way it is, or Ukraine to be the way it is.

So, the idea of predicting how this world will go is a tall order, but I think we can expect, increasing fragmentation, increasing divisiveness, and therefore the role of diplomats and foreign policy experts. I have to believe nobody wants war. That is a fundamental premise on we do diplomacy. And so therefore, you know, we exercise the very best of our, our craft and professionalism to manage these, dynamics for disagreements to become disputes. And as the prime minister said, we have to prevent disagreements becoming disputes and contests becoming conflicts.

And I think he nailed the challenge of diplomacy and foreign policy on his head with that statement. And that’s the order that the world places on foreign policy these days.